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Design and Implementation of a Distributed Platform for Sharing
IP Flow Records
Abstract
Experiments using real traffic traces are of key importance in many network management research
fields, such as traffic characterization, intrusion detection, and accounting. Access to such traces is often
restricted due to privacy issues; research institutions typically have to sign non-disclosure agreements
before accessing such traces from a network operator. Having such restrictions, researchers rarely have
more than one source of traffic traces on which to run and validate their experiments. Therefore, this
paper develops a Distributed Platform for Sharing IP Flows (DipSIF) based on NetFlow records
between multiple institutions. It is assumed that NetFlow traces collected by each participant are
archived on separate storage hosts within their premises and then made available to others using a server
that acts as a gateway to the storage. Due to privacy reasons the platform presented here uses a
prefix-preserving, cryptography-based, and consistent anonymization algorithm in order to comply to
different regulations determining the exchange of traffic traces data. 
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Abstract. Experiments using real traffic traces are of key importance in many
network management research fields, such as traffic characterization, intrusion
detection, and accounting. Access to such traces is often restricted due to priva-
cy issues; research institutions typically have to sign non-disclosure agreements
before accessing such traces from a network operator. Having such restrictions,
researchers rarely have more than one source of traffic traces on which to run
and validate their experiments. 
Therefore, this paper develops a Distributed Platform for sharing IP Flows
(DipSIF) based on NetFlow records between multiple institutions. It is assumed
that NetFlow traces collected by each participant are archived on separate stor-
age hosts within their premises and then made available to others using a gate-
way. Due to privacy reasons the platform presented here uses a prefix-preserv-
ing, cryptography-based, and consistent anonymization algorithm in order to
comply to different regulations determining the exchange of traffic traces data. 
1 Introduction and Problem Statement
Internet Protocol (IP) traffic traces are widely used by researchers for different pur-
poses. On one hand, traces are used to observe traffic characteristics to improve traf-
fic analysis tools. On the other hand, they are used to evaluate new intrusion or traffic
anomaly detection algorithms based on real traffic traces. One important drawback
when designing new algorithms for the analysis of IP traffic is the lack of access to
many real traffic traces based on which the new algorithms can be evaluated. Often
traffic traces are used, which are available locally (such as those captured within a lab
network or within a subnetwork of a university), but they rarely have access to traces
collected by other parties. 
Within one of its activities, the European project EMANICS [6] designed a plat-
form that can be used to share NetFlow records collected at multiple sites in order to
make them available to researchers at different sites. In order to achieve this sharing,
the platform offers well-defined interfaces allowing researchers to access in a similar
way NetFlow records stored locally as well as remotely from any host connected to
the Internet. In order to fulfil privacy protection and to comply to regulations for traf-
fic trace exchange, the platform uses a prefix-preserving, cryptography-based, and
consistent anonymization algorithm. The platform is fully specified, it has been im-
plemented as a prototype as described below, and tested.
Cristian Morariu, Peter Racz, Burkhard Stiller
After discussing related work in Sect. 2, the design of the IP flow records sharing
platform is presented Sect. 3. While Sect. 4 outlines implementation details, Sect. 5
provides a functional evaluation of the system. Finally, Sect. 6 summarizes the paper
and discusses possible future work.
2 Related Work
The two most important aspects that determine the design of DipSIF are (a) the traf-
fic trace collection and storing as well as (b) the anonymization for sharing. 
2.1 Flow Record Collection and Storage
As defined in [5] a flow record contains information about a specific flow that was
observed at an Observation Point. A flow record contains measured properties of the
flow (e.g., the total number of packets and bytes transferred in the flow) and usually
characteristic properties of the flow (e.g., source and destination IP addresses). Typi-
cally an IP flow record is identified by at least the following unique keys: source IP
address, destination IP address, source port, destination port, and protocol type. Dif-
ferent solutions, tools, and protocols exist to collect and store IP flow records. 
etFlow [4] — embedded in most Cisco routers — includes a NetFlow exporter
component, which summarizes the traffic traversing routers in NetFlow records and
exports those to remote collectors using the NetFlow protocol. Today different ver-
sions of the NetFlow protocol exist. Version 1 — the export format released initially
— is rarely used today. Version 5 enhanced the initial specification and it is the most
commonly used version today. Version 7 added support for data export from aggrega-
tion caches. The latest version is Version 9 and it specifies a flexible and extensible
format, which provides the versatility needed for supporting new fields and record
types. This format accommodates support of new technologies and introduces a tem-
plate-based flow record transfer. Templates provide an efficient record transfer and al-
low record format extensions without concurrent changes to the basic record format.
The IP Information Export (IPFIX) protocol [5] is a flow record transfer protocol
standardized by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). The IPFIX protocol is
based on the NetFlow v9 protocol.
Cflowd [3] is a flow analysis tool that can be used to analyze Cisco NetFlow
records. The package allows data collection as well as analysis in support of trends es-
timation, traffic tracking, accounting, and billing. 
Flow-Tools [10] is a powerful combination of a network flow collector and a flow
analyzer. The flow collector can support single, distributed, and multiple servers for
several NetFlow versions. The flow-capture module is used to collect NetFlow
records (only User Datagram Protocol, no Stream Control Transmission Protocol)
from network devices and store them in files in raw format. Then, either flow-print or
flow-cat decodes the files for analyzing purposes. 
fdump [9] is a package providing tools to collect, process, and store network
flow data. The nfdump toolkit also provides a converter for transforming flow-tools
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NetFlow records into nfdump formatted files. Nfdump stores flow records in time-
sliced files with a timestamp attached to the filename. Afterwards, particular files can
either be merged or divided again in order to perform further analysis on it.
Argus [1] is a real-time flow monitor, which is able to track and report network
transactions it observes from packets collected on a network interface in promiscuous
mode. The major difference to Cisco NetFlow records is that Argus flow records con-
sider each traffic flow as a bidirectional sequence of packets that typically contain two
sub-flows, one for each direction. There are two types of Argus records: the Manage-
ment Audit Record and a Flow Activity Record, where the former provides informa-
tion about Argus itself, and the latter provides information about network flows.
2.2 Flow Record Anonymization
Anonymization is the process of hiding the identity of a particular client of a network
by inspecting IP packets sent. Anonymization of traffic traces cannot be applied for
all applications. Some applications, e.g., accounting and traffic engineering, require
the original traffic in order to assign costs to a particular user or to detect where and
why a congestion appeared in the network. Several anonymization algorithms are
known, but there is no standardized method for anonymizing traffic traces. The fol-
lowing anonymization techniques are encountered in different tools:
• Truncation: This defines the basic type of IP address anonymization. The user
chooses the number n of least significant bits to truncate from an IP address.
E.g., truncating n=8 bits would replace an IP address with the corresponding
class C network address.
• Random permutations: With this method, a random permutation on the set of
possible IP addresses is applied to translate IP addresses. A 32-bit block cipher
represents a subset of permutations on the IP address space. The use of random
hash tables implements a truly random permutation [8]. Thus, it is possible to
generate any permutation, not just one from some a subset of the possible ones.
• Prefix-preserving pseudonymization: This special class of permutations has a
unique structure-preserving property: Two anonymized IP addresses match on a
prefix of n bits, if and only if the unanonymized addresses match on a prefix of
n bits as well. This is achieved by a user-supplied passphrase, which generates a
cipher key that in turn determines the permutation to be applied. This allows for
an anonymization with a consistent mapping between multiple anonymizers
sharing a common key. 
Based on these mechanisms several anonymization tools are used in practice. TCPd-
priv [11] implements a table-based, prefix-preserving translation of IP addresses. In
order to maintain the consistency of the anonymization, it stores a set of <raw, ano-
nymized> binding pairs of IP addresses. Whenever a new IP address needs to be ano-
nymized, it will be compared with all raw IP addresses within stored binding pairs for
the longest prefix match. For remaining bits, where no prefix is stored inside the bind-
ing table, a pseudorandom function is applied. TCPdpriv removes sensitive informa-
tion by operating only on packet headers. The TCP and UDP payload is simply re-
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moved, while the entire IP payload is discarded for protocols other than TCP or UDP.
The tool provides multiple levels of anonymization, from leaving fields unchanged up
to performing a more strict anonymization.
CryptoPAn [13] is a cryptography-based network trace anonymization tool with a
prefix-preserving property. In CryptoPAn the mapping from original IP addresses to
anonymized IP addresses is one-to-one. To anonymize traces, CryptoPAn uses a se-
cret key that is used across multiple traces. This allows multiple traces to be ano-
nymized in a consistent way over time and across locations. That is, the same IP ad-
dress in different traces is anonymized to the same address, even though traces might
be anonymized separately at different time and/or at different locations. CryptoPAn is
used in many different tools such as CANINE [8] or nfdump. 
AAPI (Anonymization Application Programming Interface) [7] is a C-based ano-
nymization library. This tool provides a fast on-line anonymization support as well as
composition, decomposition, and filtering of NetFlow version 5 and 9 traces previous-
ly saved in the tcpdump [12] format. AAPI uses randomizing, replacing, and prefix-
preserving anonymization techniques.
CAIE [8] addresses several aspects. It supports different anonymization meth-
ods on different fields of a flow record; IP address truncation, random permutations,
and prefix-preserving pseudonymization; bilateral classification, black marker ano-
nymization of port numbers; protocol number replacement; timestamp annihilation,
random timeshift, timestamp enumeration; and byte count replacement. CANINE also
acts as a powerful converter between different versions of NetFlow records. 
2.3 Comparison and Discussion
TCPdpriv shows two major drawbacks: it only provides online anonymization and it
cannot anonymize parallel traces within a distributed environment in a consistent
way. CryptoPAn does not have these restrictions and it allows for a consistent ano-
nymization between several anonymizers based on the shared cipher key. Further-
more, it is fast to anonymize flow records online. AAPI and CANINE provide more
than anonymization. Besides several techniques for veiling different flow record
fields, both support cryptography-based, prefix-preserving IP anonymization.
In case operators decide to anonymize their data, researchers do not have a tool at
their disposal, which can make these traces available in the Internet, thus, they often
have to spend time to find new public traces. DipSIF addresses these issues by provid-
ing a platform with which any NetFlow data owner can share data, while still being
able to apply authorization policies and anonimize data before being sent. DipSIF in-
tegrates the widely used NetFlow data storage tools into existing repositories. 
3 Design
In order to enable such a sharing between different institutions, the design of DipSIF
focused on a architecture with access control and online traffic anonymization. Based
on requirements determined, the resulting architecture is fully decentralized. 
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3.1 Requirements
Based on the investigation of distributed trace handling the following key require-
ments have been identified for DipSIF:
• Retrieval of remotely stored NetFlow data: The major requrement is to supply a
researcher with an Application Programming Interface (API) for querying flow
records from any remote NetFlow repository of participating parties.
• Access control: The platform shall offer an authentication mechanism and fine
granular access control to NetFlow data stored. Each storage provider shall be
in the position to decide independently, which users or groups of users will have
access to flow traces collected.
• Online anonymization: Any request for NetFlow records shall result in ano-
nymized records being sent to the requester. The anonymization shall be done
online and at least mutate IP addresses stored within NetFlow records in a pre-
fix-preserving manner.
• Encryption: Communication channels between all distributed components are
typically not trustworthy, all communication shall be cryptographically secured.
3.2 Architecture
Exploiting those requirements a three-tiered architecture (cf. Fig. 1) has been de-
signed. The architecture consists of a retrieval service running on separate storage
nodes (1st tier), an authentication and forwarding service on a set of gateway nodes
(2nd tier), and a client library that offers an API (3rd tier) for accessing arbitrary Net-
Flow datasets from any of those repositories available. The secure communication is
achieved by using Secure Socket Layer (SSL), offering client and server authentica-
tion, data integrity, and a cryptographically secured channel for communication be-
tween client and server. A query including optional filters and other control messages
from clients results in anonymized NetFlow records being returned to the requester. 
While the first (and third) tier clearly show a server (and client) functionality, the
second tier features a dual behavior: it acts as a client, when requesting NetFlow
records from the local storage component, and at the same time it acts as a server,
when handling requests received from remote clients. Fig. 2 illustrates the architectur-
al design of the sharing platform. It can be seen in this figure how information is ex-
changed between a client, a server, and a storage node. The figure also shows how the
different components are deployed and how they interract. 
Fig. 1. Three tier architecture
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The end-user using an API can build any application for NetFlow record retriev-
al. In order to access any functionality of the API the client needs to pass an authenti-
cation process beforehand. After a successful authentication the client is enabled to
request flow data. In a first step a request message containing the type of the desired
dataset needs to be created, which is passed to the server by invoking an appropriate
remote procedure defined in the API. 
When the server receives the client's request message, it checks the preconfigured
authorization and anonymization policy using the Access Control module. The author-
ization result is logged and if the user is allowed to have access to the NetFlow repos-
itory the request is forwarded together with the anonymization policy to the storage
component. The storage service searches the appropriate dataset in the repository, an-
onymizes the dataset according to the received anonymization policy, and finally ap-
plies desired filters, which are passed within the request message. The resulting data-
set is returned by the replaying module directly to the client as a stream of NetFlow
packets.
3.3 Client Component
The client component serves as an entry point to DipSIF. It includes a library and its
API, which can be used to communicate with other components. The library enables a
user — possessing a valid certificate — to request flow traces collected from remote
storage repositories. Requests of NetFlow records can be made using the API, which
hides the actual retrieval process. Users shall only care about what (i.e. filters) data
and from where (i.e. server URL) they require data, but not how it is obtained.
The client library can buffer NetFlow records sent by the storage node's replay
component and simultaneously deliver them to the application, built on top of the cli-
ent library, at a controlled rate. Therefore, incoming NetFlow records are received and
decoded by the Capture Thread that adds them to a temporary FIFO list, as illustrat-
ed in Fig. 3. Simultaneously, the Controller Thread pops out buffered NetFlow
Fig. 2. Architecture
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records according to user specified events. In addition to this mechanism, the request
message includes a delay attribute for the purpose of adjusting the rate of NetFlow
records sent by the storage componen. This helps avoiding buffer overflows on the re-
ceiver side. Before sending a request to a selected server, the client application binds
a receiver to an unused local port and attaches this information to the request mes-
sage. The port number is used to tell the replaying module of the storage component,
where to return the requested data to. 
The request message includes the following attributes:
• User identity (i.e. accepted and valid certificate)
• Desired server (e.g., emanicslab1.csg.uzh.ch)
• Return address (i.e. IP:port)
• Requested data (i.e. time-period)
• Optional filters (e.g., port- and/or protocol-based)
• Delay option (e.g., delay each record by 10 microseconds)
Upon the receipt of a request message the server component replies with the result of
the request authorization. 
3.4 Server Component
The server component serves as a relay point for the client-to-storage communica-
tion. It performs client authentication and authorization and controls the access to
storage repositories. Each server component maintains its own credential repository
(truststore) that manages a list of X.509 certificates of users to which access is grant-
ed. Requesters need to authenticate by using their corresponding private key stored in
their keystore before their query is forwarded to the storage node. A Public Key Infra-
structure (PKI) additionally shares public keys in order to allow for an encryption of
the communication channel using SSL.
All servers use a predefined port for accepting incoming queries. The server inter-
face allows client applications to communicate with server instances by calling re-
mote methods defined by the interface using Remote Method Invocation (RMI). The
server interface allows for retrieving the server's actual state and for sending request
messages to storage components. Users with a valid and authorized certificate can re-
quest to order and filter the resulting dataset by means of the following options, or a
combination thereof:
• Time (i.e. start-/end-time of flow records)
• Port numbers (e.g., traffic with destination port larger 80)
• Protocol types (e.g., TCP — Transport Control Protocol, UDP — User Data-
gram Protocol, ICMP — Internet Control Messaging Protocol)
Fig. 3. A controllable capturing unit
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In order to provide access control, every client interacting with the server needs to au-
thenticate by means of a certificate. Only authenticated users will receive necessary
privileges to retrieve flow records of any of the remote storage repositories. Server
administrators can review a client’s certificate and decide, whether the certificate is
added to the server’s truststore (cf. Fig. 4). The certificate can be issued by a local
certification authority as well. 
The server supports two groups of users, administrators and certified clients. The
first group, which includes administrators is allowed to maintain server and storage
components, grants registration requests from new users by accepting their certifi-
cates to the server's truststore, manages user accounts, and assigns anonymization set-
tings to individual users and groups. The second group includes the clients to which
access to NetFlow data is allowed. Certified clients must have a valid and accepted
certificate and can request flow data. Such requests can be made by applications re-
siding on the client using an API that is described in Sect. 4. Clients are not author-
ized to modify any flow data and to request any unanonymized flow data.
For the purpose of (a) monitoring the platform's performance and (b) controlling
the data exchange, any incoming request and outgoing data stream, respectively, is
logged to a file by the storage component at the moment of delivery. The information
included in the log file consists of the request timestamp, the requestor’s identity
(username, usergroup, and IP address), anonymization options, the time period of re-
quested flow records, filter types applied, and the processing time.
3.5 Storage Component
The storage component is responsible for the storage of NetFlow records. The Dip-
SIF architecture does not define the way on how flow records are collected — any
tool can be used to fill the storage component with flow records. NetFlow records can
Fig. 4. Registration process.
Design and Implementation of a Distributed Platform for Sharing IP Flow Records
be stored in databases or directly in binary files in their raw format. Thus, the design
of DipSIF is independent of the storage type. 
The storage interface of the storage component offers methods allowing for the
searching and retrieving sets of flow records from a repository independent of the
flow record's type and independent of the storage system (database or a raw files).
The interface is capable of handling multiple heterogeneous storage repositories at-
tached to the server component as illustrated in Fig. 5. Due to the fact that NetFlow
records come in many different, incompatible formats, the storage platform allows for
handling more than one specific type of flow record. In this case the storage server
translates all flow records into the NetFlow version 5 format. 
For anonymizing IP packets, the CryptoPan [13] prefix-preserving IP address an-
onymization algorithm is applied on a dataset before being forwarded to a requester.
The key for anonimization is created upon the authentication process by the server
component and sent to the client once the authentication is successful. The flow data
is stored in its original state and is not being anonymized until it leaves the storage
node. During anonymization, only IP addresses are anonymized while other NetFlow
fields are kept unchanged. The reason why those fields are kept unanonymized is that
for many research approaches realistic network traces are needed. In order to increase
the privacy protection, the platform rebuilds the cipher key that is used as a base for
the anonymization procedure. For every incoming request, the server generates a ses-
sion key that will be used to anonymize NetFlow records within that session.
4 Implementation
A prototype of the design described was implemented in Java using the Java Develop-
ment Kit 5.0 (JDK5). An outline of the implementation architecture is shown in
Fig. 6. As it can be seen in the figure, communication between the client and the serv-
er as well as between the server and the storage component uses Remote Method In-
vocation (RMI) calls. All communication between the client component and the serv-
er uses an SSL connection. The backward communication between the storage com-
ponent and the client uses the NetFlow version 5 protocol. The prototype uses the
nfdump format to store flow records in files. Since CryptoPAn [13] is an integral part
of the nfdump toolchain and its capabilities serves ideally for the given requirements,
it is used as the anonymizing tool for.
Fig. 5. Multiple heterogeneous storage repositories attached to a server component.
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An application developer, who wants to use the sharing platform needs to use the
nfshare library, extend the class FlowHandler found in its API and override the meth-
ods init() and handle(). The init method is used to send requests to remote repositor-
ies. An example of this method is shown below: 
private void init() throws Exception {
Request request = new Request(
"emanicslab1.csg.uzh.ch",  // the server URL
null,                      // your IP (auto)
9992,                      // receiver port
"2008/06/20-2008/06/22",   // time window
"src port > 1024 and tcp", // filter options
1000,                      // delay
5                          // limit
);
      FlowController fc = new FlowController();
      fc.subscribe(this);
      fc.start(request);
}
The FlowController object is responsible for handling one request and delivering
the data received to the application. The handle() method is a callback used by the cli-
ent library to inform the application whenever a new flow record is received. It’s sig-
nature is: 
protected void handle(Flowrecord record)
The new flow record is passed to the application by a FlowController object as a
FlowRecord object. An example application component is shown in Fig. 6 as the Cli-
entApplication class. 
The prototype includes storage modules for nfDump and FlowTools. In order to
support other NetFlow storage formats the StorageAdapter interface needs to be im-
plemented and specialized for those specific formats. The Shell class allows for the
execution of Linux shell commands, a requirement for some storage toolkits that do
not offer an API to access flow data, but only binary programs for handling that data. 
Fig. 6. Implementation Architecture
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5 Evaluation
Based on the introduced and important functional requirements of the flow record
sharing platform (cf. Sect. 3.1), the design was done (cf. Sect. 3.2 to Sect. 3.5), and
the implementation (Sect. 4) was undertaken. Thus, a functional evaluation is possi-
ble, while the running prototype shows the feasibility: 
• Retrieval of stored etFlow data: The DipSIF offers an API allowing for the
query of NetFlow records from remote repositories. The library offers several
instruments to control the kind of requested data as well as the received data
stream. A set of available filter options allows for sorting requested NetFlow
records by specific attributes, such as IP protocol or port numbers. The stream
receoved is controled by delaying individual NetFlow records, by limiting the
amount of data, and by interrupting it for a given time period.
• Access control: Authentication is implemented usinng a PKI while authoriza-
tion uses access lists. Each storage provider is in the position to decide inde-
pendently to which users access to collected flow traces is granted. Any client
needs to hand over a signed certificate to the administrator in charge of the de-
sired repository in order to be able to access the corresponding NetFlow data. 
• Online anonymization: Any NetFlow record is anonymized before being sent to
the requester at the moment it leaves the storage node. The prototype imple-
mented uses the CryptoPAn library to anonymize NetFlow records. The ano-
nymization is done in a prefix-preserving manner.
• Encryption: The communication between the client and server component is en-
crypted using an SSL connection. However, the NetFlow transfer between the
storage component and the client is left unprotected. 
The modular design as well as a storage interfaces which is independent of the stor-
age technology allow implementation of add-on modules for different storage for-
mats besides the nfdump format which was used in the prototype. 
6 Summary and Future Work
Network traces determine one of the wider testing data for researchers working in the
field of traffic analysis. Access to such traces is often a problem, either because of ad-
ministratrive reasons, which prevent network operators to share their traffic data, or
either because of the lack of a search tool for existing traffic traces in the Internet. 
The work presented here proposed the DipSIF architecture as a sharing platform
for NetFlow records. On one hand, it allows owners of traffic traces to share their data
with researchers and provides them with access control mechanisms to control who
will have access to those traces. It also provides anonymization capabilities so that no
IP address involved in the real traffic is revealed. On the other hand, it allows re-
searchers and protocol designers with an easy and standard access to repositories re-
siding remotely and provides tools for controlling the data that is actually retrieved.
Such a control will help to decrease data transfers, because researchers can specify,
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which data from a dataset is important for their research and only download these data
instead of downloading a whole traffic trace, which includes — besides the interested
traffic data — those data, which are unnecessary for the current research question
tackled. 
The prototype presented can be improved further by adding additional functionali-
ty. For example the authorization process can be extended in order to allow an admin-
istrator to limit explicit flow records to which an external user has access (e.g. exter-
nal access could be allowed only to web traffic). Another useful extension is the pos-
sibility to perform processing on the remote storage in order to return just a result
rather than a large number of flow records themselves. 
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